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abstract: Since the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope in 1989, a neoliberal discourse has dominated the thinking of the political 
elite in post-communist countries, paving the way for unprecedented mass 
privatisation, economic deregulation, and other market reforms. In this article, 
we study the development of public support for market economy principles 
in post-communist countries compared to other European countries between 
1999 and 2008, the period that directly followed the initial stage of market 
transformation. The article is based on data from the European Values Study 
covering 22 European countries for the years 1999/2000 and 2008/2009. In ad-
dition to analysing the trends, multilevel regression models are used to study 
the determinants and levels of support for the market economy in post-com-
munist and other European countries. When controlling for individual and 
country-level variables, a significant increase in support for market economy 
principles is observed in the post-communist cluster, which is not the case in 
the other countries. There is some inconsistency in support for the individual 
principles of market economics: support exists in post-communist countries 
for the notion that the state should be responsible for the social and economic 
well-being of its inhabitants and for state regulation of the economy, while 
support is high for some market economy principles, such as free competition 
and private ownership. In other words, support for some kind of social market 
seems to prevail among people living in post-communist countries, based on 
the notion that the state should combine a market economy with relatively 
generous social policies. 
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introduction
During the initial economic transformation period in the 1990s, neoliberalism 
dominated the public discourse in the European post-communist countries, as 
privatisation, economic liberalisation and deregulation, competitiveness, and 
growth were among the most highly prioritised objectives [Ferge 1997; Offe 1996]. 
The fall of communism coincided with the peak of neoliberalism’s global diffu-
sion and there were no influential transnational networks advocating alternatives 
to neoliberal theories [Ban 2016: 23]. Thus, the post-communist countries have 
prioritised policies that support these objectives. Even in the latter stage of the 
economic transformation (during the 2000s), these countries often pursued more 
radical market-oriented reforms than other EU countries, such as implementing 
a flat tax, reducing corporate taxes, and privatising the pension systems [Appel 
and Orenstein 2016]. The implementation of market reforms, however, did not 
entail simply transmitting the principles of market fundamentalism, but rather 
involved adopting them into the context of the transition to a market economy. 
A role in this was thus played by local conditions and external pressures [Ban 
2016]. In particular, the reforms to maximise markets and competition were bal-
anced with state intervention in such areas as economic protectionism. In ad-
dition, policy-makers in the post-communist countries deliberately used social 
policies to prevent public protest against the reforms [e.g. Offe 1996; Vanhuysse 
2006] and developed the various types of hybrid welfare regimes that are in place 
today which combine liberal policies with conservative-Bismarckian and social-
democratic universalist policies [Cerami 2006; Inglot 2008; Hemerijck 2013; Kuitto 
2016]. 
The market reforms that were introduced in the post-communist countries 
raise questions about how the population views these reforms and whether they 
are legitimate and politically sustainable in the long term. This is particularly 
interesting given the fact that people now have decades of experience with the 
market reforms, and the economic and societal contexts have changed over the 
years (e.g. due to population ageing and increasing pressures on public budgets). 
Previous studies have shown that there is support for revising some of the radical 
market reforms in the post-communist countries, while others indicate that sup-
port for market principles is lower in post-communist countries than in other Eu-
ropean countries (see below). In addition, previous studies have confirmed that 
there is strong public support for welfare state intervention and redistribution 
policies in the post-communist countries because of the deeply-rooted egalitarian 
values among the population stemming from the ‘communist legacy’ [Andreß 
and Heien 2001; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Dallinger 2010]. Furthermore, 
as the ‘compensation/government protection hypothesis’ predicts, the experi-
ence of economic hardship during transition to a market economy increases sup-
port for welfare policies [e.g. Vis et al. 2011]. Given that post-communist countries 
experienced hardship during the transition to a market economy, the legitimacy 
of market reforms may weaken over time. Orenstein [2009] argues that neoliberal 
Articles
321
economic reforms have produced mixed results: rapid economic transformation 
at the beginning of the transition and increased vulnerability to global economic 
crisis and capital flows later have led to increases in unemployment, poverty, and 
mortality and a decline in fertility (depending on the country). According to the 
‘Life in Transition’ survey conducted in 2006 by the EBRD, most people in these 
countries reported in 2006 that they were economically better off under com-
munism.
This paper analyses how public support for market economy principles de-
veloped during the 1999–2008 period in the post-communist countries compared 
to other European countries. This question concerns the legitimacy and political 
sustainability of previous and ongoing economic reforms. One might expect that 
attitudes to market principles would diverge between post-communist countries 
and the rest of Europe given their different starting points, the communist legacy, 
and the different societal, economic and political conditions at the beginning of 
the 1990s. With this in mind, we investigate whether the communist legacy has 
been fading in the public mind over time in the post-communist countries. In par-
ticular, the unique experience the public gained during the transition period may 
become more important than the communist legacy. The question of the conver-
gence/divergence between the post-communist countries and other European 
countries is interesting given that the impact of the communist legacy combined 
with the unique experience of radical and rapid market transformation in post-
communist countries has not yet been studied much. 
Our study contributes to the discourse on attitudes towards economic re-
forms, as we focus on the 1999–2008/9 period to compare attitudes during the 
transition period with attitudes in the post-transition period and examine how 
the legitimacy of market reforms is changing. 
Theoretical assumptions
In this section, we first discuss the market reforms that have occurred in post- 
communist countries since 1989 in order to provide the empirical and theoretical 
background for our study. We then discuss what previous studies have conclu-
ded about attitudes to market reforms in both post-communist countries and 
other countries. 
Market reforms in post-communist countries
Economic and structural reforms in post-communist countries helped to establish 
the principles of markets, competition, and open trade in the public discourse. 
The open, market-based economy promotes individual initiative and self-interest 
[compare, e.g., Barr 1994; Fischer and Gelb 1991; Kórnai 1997; Offe 1996; Švejnar 
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2002].1 The market reforms were accompanied by measures to stabilise the econo-
my, such as wage and inflation controls and public deficit alleviation. Social pro-
tection measures were introduced to alleviate the negative social consequences 
of the transition to a market economy, to enhance social cohesion, and to prevent 
the public’s resistance to the market reforms that were adopted [e.g. Bohle and 
Greskovits 2007; Offe 1996; Orenstein 2001; Roland 2002; Vanhuysse 2006].
Specific features of the market reforms in post-communist countries may 
have influenced the public’s attitudes to and support for the reforms. Some au-
thors who study market reforms in post-communist countries claim that neolib-
eralism (in the Baltic countries), or ‘embedded neoliberalism’ (in the Visegrad 
countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), has dominated 
policy-making and that social protection has become subordinated to the objec-
tive of competitiveness [e.g. Bohle and Greskovits 2007; Van Apeldoorn 2002]. 
Scholars have also noted that privatisation policies in post-communist countries 
were not accompanied by the development of the appropriate institutions for reg-
ulating the markets. The ineffective functioning of the legal systems of these coun-
tries, the weak standards of fiscal discipline, and high levels of corruption have 
provided evidence of this [e.g. Williams and Balaz 1999; Estrin 1994, 2008]. Con-
sequently, strategic decisions regarding privatisation were largely determined by 
the political and social interests of the elite, as they used their privileged access to 
political power to accumulate wealth. Indeed, privatisation methods were quite 
innovative given the small stock of domestic private savings [Estrin 2008], but 
they often led to serious problems due to the lack of regulation. For example, the 
voucher privatisation scheme in the Czech Republic led to fraud and the outright 
theft of assets by fund managers in a process referred to as ‘tunnelling’ [Estrin 
2008]. Moreover, before any formal privatisation took place in post-communist 
countries, members of the ruling communist nomenklatura engaged in ‘sponta-
neous privatisation’ through the blatant theft of state assets. Desai and Olofsgard 
[2006] argue that, despite the positive effects of market reforms, citizens in post-
communist countries blamed market reforms for endemic corruption [e.g. Kauf-
mann and Siegelbaum 1996], political deadlock, and the increased vulnerability 
of many segments of the population to economic deprivation.
In addition, the poor institutional environment (e.g. poorly-designed tax 
laws and deficiencies in the institutional capacity of the state to collect taxes) led to 
problems such as large-scale tax evasion and an extensive shadow economy [e.g. 
Berend and Bugaric 2015; Hugh and Sporri 2007; Offe 1996; Torgler 2003]. Several 
scholars consider the interaction between the state’s institutional capacity and tax 
evasion to be a vicious circle: trust in government, satisfaction with public serv-
ants, and a positive evaluation of the political system correlate strongly with high 
tax morale, whereas corruption hurts tax morale [Easter 2002; Torgler 2003, 2005].
1 We refer here only to the basic principles of a market economy.
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Although politicians and policy-makers in post-communist countries were 
strongly influenced by the neoliberal discourse that became hegemonic during the 
transition to a market economy, with respect to social policies they were generally 
much more cautious and pragmatic. First, politicians mitigated the negative so-
cial impacts of the transition to a market economy by creating and implementing 
social safety nets, unemployment protection, and some active labour market poli-
cies—job mediation/counselling, vocational training, and targeted job subsidies. 
Second, some countries followed a ‘divide and pacify’ strategy [Vanhuysse 2006], 
which divided weaker social groups so as to hinder their ability to unite around 
their interests and protest against market reforms. Third, in policy areas with long-
er social policy traditions, such as family policy or health care, post-communist 
countries were bound by higher degrees of path dependency as there were greater 
entrenched interests and stronger policy legacies [Saxonberg et al. 2013]. 
Attitudes to market reforms in the West and East
Studies of attitudes to market reforms implemented since the 1980s in Western 
Europe, the US, and Latin America have yielded ambiguous results. For example, 
studies show that, in the United Kingdom, the population was generally favour-
able in its view of market reforms, but they also displayed a tendency to hold the 
government responsible for economic circumstances [Studlar et al. 1990]. Simi-
larly, Thompson and Elling’s [2000] study of the US finds that although the public 
took a generally positive view of privatisation, most respondents still wanted the 
public sector to deliver the majority of individual services. This was especially 
true for services with a history of public provision or where regulation was a part 
of the governmental function. In the case of France, Durant and Legge [2002] con-
firm the findings of previous studies on the UK and the US that the privatisation 
of public services is driven by the elite rather than mass/median voters. Battaglio 
[2009] compares several countries with developed market economies and finds 
that respondents are generally apprehensive about privatising certain sectors, 
such as electricity and hospitals (due to fears of rate increases and delays), but 
respondents in countries with systems based on common law are favourable to-
wards privatising the banking sector, while those living in countries based on 
civil law oppose it. 
The Latin American population is even more in favour of revising market 
reforms. Panizza and Yañez [2005] explain the increasing discontent with market 
reforms as resulting from the low level of trust in political actors, the deteriora-
tion of the economic situation, the change in the political orientation of the popu-
lation, and the increase in political activism. In particular, corruption accompany-
ing the privatisation process and increasing income inequalities are responsible 
for the sense of dissatisfaction that exists among the majority of the public in 
Latin American countries [e.g. Checchi et al. 2006; Davis and Coleman 2001]. 
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Some studies compare developed market economy countries to transition 
economies (i.e. post-communist countries). In general, people in post-commu-
nist countries are more resistant to market reforms and more supportive of the 
need for government responsibility. Kluegel et al. [1999] show that although in 
1991 people living in post-communist countries (except the former East Germa-
ny) held more negative opinions of their country’s economic performance than 
those living in other European countries, they were equally or more strongly sup-
portive of capitalist principles, while at the same time being more supportive of 
egalitarianism. Studies have also concluded that if the population perceives the 
existing economic order to be fair, it is much more likely to support market-based 
solutions. For example, Legge and Rainey [2003] find that there is much less sup-
port for the privatisation of banks, hospitals, and electricity in the Bundesländer2 
of the former East Germany than in the Bundesländer of the West. They identify 
three reasons for the difference in attitudes: (1) the negative experience with the 
market transformation in post-communist countries; (2) the socialisation effect 
(people in post-communist countries learned to rely on the government during 
the communist era); and (3) the relative absence of democratic values and the 
lack of confidence in the democratic process (political efficacy). Similarly, Batt-
aglio and Legge [2009] compare attitudes towards privatising the electricity in-
dustry in ten developed market economies and seven post-communist countries. 
Their results show there is much less support for privatisation in post-communist 
countries because of the suffering that people experienced from the market re-
forms, the lower level of political efficacy, and the weaker confidence in the civil 
servants who implement the policies. 
Scholars that focus closely on post-communist countries observe that public 
support for the reversal of market reforms is generally quite high, but attitudes 
also depend on an individual’s characteristics. People who possess the relevant 
market skills for doing well in a market economy (e.g. entrepreneurs and those 
employed in high-skilled occupations) are more supportive of market reforms 
and privatisation [Denisova et al. 2009], as are those with greater human capital 
[Denisova et al. 2012; Kaltenhalter et al. 2006]. Conversely, Rovelli and Zaiceva 
[2013] report that support for market reforms is lower among women, the elderly, 
the less educated, the unemployed, and the poor. Furthermore, people who do 
not own private property, who suffered economic hardship during the reforms, 
and who work in the public sector are also less supportive of market reforms. In 
other words, as the economic hypothesis predicts, those who benefit most are the 
most supportive of reforms, while those who suffer most are the least supportive.
At the country level, economic factors also matter. Stronger economic 
growth and stability, decreasing inequality in income distribution, lower inflation 
rates, a larger private sector, a larger share of white-collar workers, and a larger 
share of university-educated people in the population all increase support for 
2 Bundesländer refers to the states of the Federal Republic of Germany.
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market reforms. Conversely, economic instability, high income inequality, high 
inflation, a larger share of blue-collar workers, and a greater portion of the popu-
lation in retirement all decrease support for reforms [Fidrmuc 2000; Golinelli and 
Rovelli 2013; Rovelli and Zaiceva 2013]. The effect of high unemployment may be 
expected to be similar. On the other hand, particularly at the beginning of the re-
forms, high unemployment may actually signal the need for more radical reforms 
and thus reinforce the support for them [Fidrmuc 1999]. 
In addition to self-interest, the legitimacy of the privatisation process also 
influences support for market reforms. For example, privatisation schemes that 
favour outsiders are perceived as being more legitimate than those that favour in-
siders, such as management and employees of formerly state-owned enterprises 
[Denisova et al. 2012]. Furthermore, the performance and quality of institutions 
(measured by the degree of the rule of law, control of corruption, and quality of 
democracy) also increase support for market reforms and privatisation [Golinelli 
and Rovelli 2013; Denisova et al. 2012; Rovelli and Zaiceva 2013]. Consequently, 
attitudes to market reforms are more positive if the population feel that the coun-
try’s democratic institutions function well [Golinelli and Rovelli 2013; Denisova 
et al. 2012; Rovelli and Zaiceva 2013]. At the same time, paradoxically, support for 
redistribution also increases when the population perceives that the country’s 
democratic institutions function well [Rovelli and Zaiceva 2013]. 
We may also expect that trust in state institutions matters [e.g. Rothstein 
1998]. The public’s specific experience with the institutions charged with protect-
ing the economic order could affect support for market principles depending on 
the extent to which the population feels that the state is operating according to 
‘the rules of the game’. If people believe that the economic and social order is 
effectively protected, they might not be apprehensive about market reforms and 
thus may support them. On the other hand, people might favour market reforms 
if they believe that the state is weak and ineffective and therefore do not trust 
state institutions to implement policies that would protect them; thus, they look 
for alternative solutions (the policy dissatisfaction hypothesis; see Oskarsen [2007]). 
Given that post-communist countries suffer from a low level of trust in state in-
stitutions [Rose, Mishler and Haerpfner 1998; Rose 2001], this hypothesis predicts 
that people living in these countries will be more supportive of market principles 
and reforms. Furthermore, individual and institutional factors interact: where 
democratic institutions function poorly, not much difference exists in support 
for market reforms between people with more and less market skills, while dif-
ferences increase when the quality of governance increases. This indicates that 
individual competences and the quality of governance are complementary in in-
creasing support for market reforms [Denisova et al. 2009].
Meanwhile, studies conclude that people in post-communist countries are 
more positive towards redistributive policies [Dallinger 2010], welfare spending 
[Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003], and ‘governmental action’ [Andreß and Heien 
2001] than people in other European countries. Even though citizens in post-com-
munist countries often voted for right-wing parties because they saw that as a 
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way of preventing the communists from returning to power, they were still used 
to holding the state responsible for the welfare of the population. Thus, support 
for generous welfare policies has remained high in post-communist countries 
[Renwick and Tóka 1998; Saxonberg 2005, 2007]. 
Two main explanations account for the strong public support for state re-
sponsibility for social policies in post-communist countries. The first is the com-
munist legacy: the communist regimes promoted relatively egalitarian policies, 
which established egalitarian values among the population, values that contin-
ued to be held after the collapse of these regimes [Andreß and Heien 2001]. Con-
sequently, support for dismantling the welfare state can be expected to be low. 
However, this legacy is expected to decrease over time [Andreß and Heien 2001; 
Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003], and people living in these countries may devel-
op attitudes similar to those of people living in other European countries. The sec-
ond explanation comes from the compensation hypothesis, which predicts that re-
sistance to welfare cutbacks will increase because of the negative social impact of 
economic fluctuations or slow economic progress [Vis et al. 2011]. Dallinger [2010: 
346] explains the comparatively high support for redistribution in post-commu-
nist countries thus: ‘If wage fairness fails, equality is expected to be realised by the 
state. If the economy fails, citizens prefer a welfare state that steps in and cushions 
the negative effects of market processes.’ This means that economic affluence and 
low unemployment should make the population less concerned about the risks 
ushered in by market reforms and thus increase its support for market principles, 
as people do not then feel vulnerable. Conversely, economic hardship is expected 
to make people more resistant to market principles and reforms. 
In summary, these studies conclude that, despite support for general mar-
ket principles and values, people living in post-communist countries tend to be 
more critical of specific market reforms, particularly those leading to cuts in the 
provision of public services and the elimination of the state regulatory role. 
Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical discussion above, we raise the following hypotheses 
about the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe: 
H1  There is less support for market principles in post-communist countries ow-
ing to the communist legacy (combined with fears about the impact of the 
economic transformation), particularly regarding rolling back the protec-
tive role/responsibility of the state. However, over time this legacy fades as 
young generations have lower expectations towards the state.
H2  Support for some market principles (e.g. the principle of free competition) 
is greater in post-communist countries because of the failures experienced 
during the command economy. However, over time, support for these eco-
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nomic principles in post-communist countries converges at levels observed 
in other European countries, as people reflect on their own experience with 
the market economy. 
We expect that support for market principles in post-communist countries is 
counterbalanced by the following factors: 
H3  Support for market principles depends on specific national-economic con-
texts such as the GDP level and unemployment level. The more uncertain-
ties or the harsher the conditions that people face, the less support there 
is for market principles/reforms in any area (government protection hypoth-
esis). Similarly, the performance of state institutions and confidence in in-
stitutions matter. The greater the dissatisfaction with state institutions and 
policies (e.g. the justice system, the social security system), the greater the 
support is for market principles (dissatisfaction hypothesis). In addition, we 
hypothesise that people might reject market reforms because they are afraid 
of losing their economic affluence and standard of social protection (fore-
gone gains hypothesis). 
H4  Support for market principles is associated with the uncertainties people 
face when confronted with market reforms, depending on their labour-mar-
ket and social status and the risks to which they are exposed. Thus, women, 
singles, people in prime age, less-educated persons, the unemployed, and 
low-income earners are less supportive of market principles. 
Data and methods
The data come from the third and fourth waves of the European Value Survey 
[EVS 2015], covering 22 European countries (N = 50,485) for the years 1999/2000 
and 2008/2009.3 In the survey, we identify four indicators to measure support 
for market economy principles. These measurements correspond to the princi-
ples of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD 2018], 
which produces transition indicators measuring progress in privatisation, gov-
ernance, state-owned enterprise restructuring (deregulation), and competition 
policy, among others.4 Additionally, we include the principle of individual versus 
3 The survey fieldwork for the third wave was conducted during 1999 in all countries 
except Finland, where it was conducted in September 2000. The survey fieldwork for the 
fourth wave was mostly carried out during 2008, but Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Italy, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom were conducted in the second half of 2009. 
4 Other EBRD transition indicators like price liberalisation and the liberalisation of trade 
and foreign exchange system are more instrumental relative to the basic/general principles 
of a market economy.
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state responsibility, which is used in the literature to measure attitudes towards 
the protective role of the state in general [e.g. Blekesaune 2007; Miller, Hesli and 
Reisinger 1994].
The wording of the survey questions used in the analysis is provided in 
Table 1.5 All items are coded from 1 to 10 such that higher values always indicate 
more support for market principles:
1)  ‘Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ide-
as’ (the free competition principle);
2)  ‘The state should give more freedom to firms’ (the deregulation principle);
3)  ‘Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves’ 
(the individual initiative/responsibility principle);
4)  ‘Private ownership of business and industry should be increased’ (the private 
ownership principle).6
Since the four variables did not give a reliable score for 22 countries (Cron-
bach’s alfa is only 0.63), we analyse these items separately. 
5 The World Values Survey also includes several suitable variables. However, in the recent 
wave of 2012, which would enable us to study the impact of the financial crisis, only seven 
European countries participated. EVS 2017 data is expected to be available by the end of 
2019. 
6 This question was asked only in 9 of the 22 countries in the year 1999.
Table 1. Definitions of the dependent variables 
Variable name Value Description 
Competition 10 Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard 
and develop new ideas
1 Competition is harmful, it brings out the worst  
in people
Responsibility 10 Individuals should take more responsibility for 
 providing for themselves
1 The state should take more responsibility to ensure 
that everyone is provided
Private ownership 1 Government ownership of business and industry 
should be increased
10 Private ownership of business and industry should be 
increased
Firm freedom 1 The state should control firms more effectively




The data allow us to study the dynamics of support for market principles 
in post-communist countries compared to other European countries. The pooled 
sample includes 9 countries with a communist past: Bulgaria (BG), Czech Repub-
lic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL), 
Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK), and 13 countries without a communist past: Bel-
gium (BE), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), 
United Kingdom (GB), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Por-
tugal (PT), and Sweden (SE).
The measures of individual-level control variables are: age, gender, edu-
cation, marital status, household income, and employment status. To identify 
differences in the support for market principles by age, we divide age into four 
categories representing cohorts. The first age category includes persons younger 
than 16 as of 1990, which means ages 16–25 in 1999 and 26–35 in 2008. The second 
age category identifies persons aged 16–25 in 1990, which means ages 26–35 in 
1999 and 36–45 in 2008. The third age category includes persons aged 26–50 in 
1990, which means ages 36–60 in 1999 and 46–70 in 2008. The fourth age category 
includes persons older than 51 in 1990, which means older than 61 in 1999 and 
older than 71 in 2008. We expect that persons who lived longer under commu-
nism will have the weakest support for market principles. Conversely, younger 
cohorts in post-communist countries, who are not influenced by the communist 
legacy, are expected to have stronger support for market principles than their 
counterparts in other European countries. In accord with Hypotheses 1 and 2, we 
expect the differences in the age cohort in post-communist countries to become 
narrower in the second period.
Furthermore, we include two variables at the individual level from the EVS 
indicating the quality of the government/state: confidence in the social security 
system and confidence in the justice system. Both variables are coded from 1 to 4, 
with the higher value indicating more confidence.
Table 2. Country-level characteristics: post-communist countries vs other Europe
GDP Unempl. rate Corruption Index
mean sd mean sd mean sd
1999
   post-communist 8.3 0.5 12.1 3.6 55.4 8.9
   other Europe 10.1 0.2 8.0 2.8 25.5 17.3
2008
   post-communist 9.3 0.3 6.4 1.6 48.1 9.0
   other Europe 10.4 0.2 6.5 2.1 23.6 13.1
Source: Eurostat [2017a, b], Transparency International.
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We use country-level variables obtained from Eurostat [2017a, b] to analyse 
the impact of economic performance (GDP per capita, unemployment rate). The 
Corruption Index is available online at www.transparency.org/cpi. We revert the 
scale so that 100 identifies a highly corrupt and 0 a very uncorrupt country. Table 
2 shows the mean values of country-level variables in two periods. The observed 
patterns confirm a high degree of convergence between post-communist coun-
tries and other European countries, although the gap in GDP and corruption re-
mains visible, while the average unemployment rates have completely converged 
in the second period. 
The household income variable in the EVS is a categorical variable that en-
sures comparability across countries. Income is measured on a three-point scale: 
low, middle, and high. However, 18% of the cases are missing. To avoid biased es-
timates, we opted for the multiple imputations approach, which creates multiple 
imputed datasets, taking into account the clustered structure of the data [Raghu-
nathan et al. 2001].7 The weight in the EVS is constructed for all national datasets 
on the basis of gender and age categories. We apply weight in the analyses to 
correct for the limitation that not all individuals from the population were given 
equal chances to participate in the survey.
Findings
In this section, we first analyse the aggregate results and then present the results 
of our multi-level regressions. 
Development of support for market economy principles during 1999–2008 in Europe
First, we examine the mean scores for the support for market principles in post-
-communist countries and other Europe in two periods. Table 3 shows the coun-
try means for all three variables along with minimum and maximum values. In-
terestingly, the support for market principles is the highest for the competition 
variable and the lowest for firm freedom. In 1999, most of the post-communist 
countries were among the leaders in support for free competition, but the gap 
narrows in the second period. Figure 1 illustrates that, relative to other variables, 
the mean scores for competition remain very robust, i.e. the position of countries 
remains close to the 45 degree line indicating little change over time. Support for 
competition is the lowest in the countries of Western Europe (i.e. Belgium, France, 
Netherlands) and Southern Europe (i.e. Italy, Portugal, Spain).
Support for firm freedom has the lowest mean scores of the three variables. 
This variable also shows the largest gap between post-communist countries and 
7 We used Stata 13 to perform the imputation and the estimation of the main model.
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other European countries (‘other Europe’), with respondents living in other Eu-
rope being much more supportive. However, this variable also shows the greatest 
convergence over time. Figure 1 illustrates the diverse trajectories in the support 
for firm freedom. The scores have increased in many post-communist countries 
but have decreased in most other European countries over time. However, the 
lowest mean scores remain in the post-communist countries (i.e. support remains 
below 5 in Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia). 
Support for individual responsibility instead of government responsibility 
has increased considerably in the post-communist countries from 5.2 to 5.9. Fig-
ure 1 shows that support for individual responsibility remains extremely low in 
Spain and Italy.
Support for private ownership instead of state ownership is considerably 
lower in post-communist countries, but the difference decreased slightly between 
1999 and 2008, when support decreased more in the other European countries 
than in the post-communist countries.8 
Notably, attitudes between the post-communist countries and other Europe 
are converging on all four questions. Nevertheless, support for most economic 
principles (i.e. individual responsibility, private ownership, and deregulation/
freedom for firms) remains lower in the post-communist countries than in other 
Europe. 
The results are compatible with our Hypotheses 1 and 2 about post-com-
munist countries having different attitudes towards market principles. There is 
more support in the post-communist countries for it being the state’s responsibil-
ity to provide for people than there is in other Europe, but at the same time there 
is also considerably more support for market competition. The differences can 
be attributed to the communist legacy, but over time post-communist countries 
have been converging with other Europe, where support for market principles 
has remained relatively stable. The results for the firm freedom (vs state control) 
variable and the support for private ownership variable are surprising: in 1999 
there was much lower support for market principles in the post-communist coun-
tries. A possible explanation for the low support for these principles may be the 
public’s experience with the weakly-controlled and non-transparent privatisation 
schemes and widespread tax evasion during the 1990s, which made people more 
supportive of state control (the government protection hypothesis). However, over 
time post-communist countries have converged towards other Europe, as sup-
port for firm freedom and private ownership has increased, while in advanced 
economies fears resulting from the financial crisis—already felt at the time of the 
2008/9 EVS survey—have spurred public support both for greater state control 
over firms and for state ownership. 
8 This question was not asked in nine countries (four of which were post-communist 
countries) and therefore the results for 1999 must be viewed with caution.




































































































































































































































































Multilevel regressions: The factors/drivers of support for market principles 
We used multilevel regression models to study the level of support for market 
principles in post-communist countries and other Europe. The models were esti-
mated separately in two periods to allow for a comparison of predictors between 
1999 and 2008. We added interaction terms for all explanatory variables with 
post-communist countries to test if correlations are statistically different from 
other Europe. Adding the interaction terms to the model changes the interpreta-
tion of the coefficients. The direct effects relate to the countries in other Europe. 
The effect of the variable in post-communist countries is given by the sum of the 
direct effect and the interaction effect. We discuss the overall significance of the 
effect below. 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimates for the individual-level variables confirm Hypothesis 4 concerning eco-
nomic self-interest. People who are less exposed to the potential risks emerging 
from reforms based on market principles are more supportive of market princi-
ples than others. In contrast, women, people in prime working age, the less-ed-
ucated, the unemployed, and those with lower incomes—and, in some respects, 
singles—all support market principles less than others. In post-communist coun-
tries, singles and better educated individuals show consistently more support for 
market principles, though the differences become milder in the second period. 
In 1999, affluent individuals in post-communist countries were more support-
ive of private ownership, firm freedom, and individual responsibility than were 
their peers in other Europe. However, this gap disappeared in the second period, 
except for support for private ownership, where the gap remained. The age co-
hort dummy confirms that older generations who spent their lives under com-
munism are substantially less supportive of market principles. In other Europe, 
by contrast, the older generations are more supportive of market principles than 
the younger age cohorts. The youngest cohorts in the post-communist countries 
show more support for private ownership, firm freedom, and individual respon-
sibility, but less support for competition as they are less influenced by the legacy 
of communism. As the communist legacy hypothesis predicts, in the post-com-
munist countries market principles are more embedded in the younger genera-
tions, which are less influenced by the communist legacy.
Country-level variables
The economic context is a significant predictor of support for market principles. 
The GDP level showed a positive correlation in other Europe in 1999, which con-
firms the protection hypothesis that economic affluence decreases people’s fears 
about the negative impacts of market reforms. However, the correlation became 
negative in 2008 and insignificant in the case of support for private ownership. 
We assume that on the eve of the global financial crisis, people in richer countries 
may have been more concerned about a considerable loss in the value of their as-
sets and about a decline in their living standard than people in less affluent coun-
tries and, consequently, they became less supportive of market principles (the 
foregone assets hypothesis). In the post-communist countries, by contrast, the cor-
relation changed from negative to positive: at the end of the 1990s, hopes for more 
economic affluence combined with the prevalent neoliberal public discourse 
triggered support for market principles among those living in these countries. 
However, in 2008 the actual level of affluence achieved mattered, as those living 
in post-communist countries perceived wealth to provide protection against the 
consequences of market reforms. Thus, by 2008 attitudes in the post-communist 
countries had become similar to those in other European countries (the govern-
ment protection hypothesis). In 1999, the unemployment level was insignificant 
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for or positively correlated with support for market reforms in the sample of all 
countries, but not amongst post-communist countries, where it correlated nega-
tively with this support. In 2008, however, it became negative and a significant 
predictor of support for the market principles of competition and firm freedom, 
as Hypothesis 3 predicts: With the coming financial crisis, people in other Euro-
pean countries, where unemployment was higher, were less supportive of mar-
ket principles as they felt more vulnerable (the government protection hypothesis). 
The exception is support for private ownership, which remained strong despite 
the high unemployment rates. In the post-communist countries, this relationship 
was even stronger and led to a significant and negative correlation between sup-
port for market principles and unemployment in both periods, except in the case 
of support for private ownership, which became insignificant in 2008. In other 
words, except for the issue of private ownership, the higher the unemployment 
rate is, the weaker the support for market principles. This also confirms the rel-
evance of the government protection hypothesis. 
The level of corruption has a negative association with support for market 
principles for both periods in other Europe. This means that the government pro-
tection hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) holds: When corruption is low, people trust the 
state to be able to ensure the functioning of the economic and social order, and 
they are not afraid to support market reforms. When there is a high level of cor-
ruption, however, people fear the impact of implementing market principles and 
prefer to have the state protect the economic and social order. Support for private 
ownership is an exception, as it is positively correlated with the corruption in-
dex. People probably believe that private ownership provides less opportunity 
for public servants to engage in corruption. In post-communist countries, by con-
trast, the correlation with the corruption level is significant and positive for sup-
porting market principles, except when it comes to support for firm freedom and 
for private ownership in 1999 and support for competition in 2008. This indicates 
that the policy dissatisfaction hypothesis is more relevant in post-communist coun-
tries: people are more supportive of market principles when corruption is high, 
as they probably do not trust the state’s ability to guarantee the economic and 
social  order.
Confidence in the social security system is a significant and negatively cor-
related predictor of support for market principles in the non-post-communist 
countries for both periods except for support for private ownership which is an 
insignificant predictor. This means that if people trust the social security system 
to protect them effectively, they are less supportive of market reforms because 
they are afraid of losing the protection provided by the system (the foregone gains 
hypothesis). In post-communist countries, by contrast, the sum of the direct ef-
fect and the interaction effect for the social security system was not significant in 
1999 (except for support for the case of individual responsibility). The effect was 
positive and significant in 2008 for the competition and individual responsibility 
variables and thus the government protection hypothesis is more relevant for those 
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living in post-communist countries: People support market principles when they 
feel protected against the negative consequences of the reforms. 
Confidence in the justice system is a significant, positive predictor of sup-
port for the market principles of competition and firm freedom but is insignifi-
cant in the case of state responsibility and private ownership. This means that if 
people in countries without a communist past feel that the economic and social 
order is ensured effectively by the justice system, they tend to support market 
principles more. If they perceive the justice system to be ineffective and do not 
trust it, they are less likely to accept some market principles: competition and 
firm freedom. Interestingly, in post-communist countries, the correlation for 1999 
is zero (i.e. the sum of the direct effect and the interaction effect is statistically not 
different from zero). This means that public support for market principles is not 
related to confidence in the justice system. However, in 2008 there is a positive 
correlation of trust in the justice system and support for firm freedom, private 
ownership, and state responsibility, but the correlation is insignificant between 
trust in the justice system and support for free market competition. These results 
provide further support for a convergence between post-communist countries 
and other Europe.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show the diminishing effects of the communist legacy in the 
support for market principles and reforms. In 1999, a decade after the fall of the 
Iron Curtain, support for individual responsibility was lower in the post-commu-
nist countries than in other European countries, as residents were more positive 
about the idea that the state should take care of them. Similarly, support for firm 
freedom and private ownership was also lower in countries with a communist 
past, although we argue this is not because of the communist legacy, but rather 
because of people’s experience during the transition period, such as uncontrol-
led privatisation, which was linked to widespread corruption. However, people 
living in post-communist countries are more supportive of free competition than 
their peers in other European countries, since this principle, as they see it, shar-
ply contrasts with the poorly performing command economy. As predicted by 
the communist legacy hypothesis, in the post-communist countries support for 
market principles has converged to the levels in other European countries. This 
means that support for free competition has declined and support for individual 
responsibility and firm freedom has increased, although it remains at lower le-
vels relative to other European countries. Support for private ownership decrea-
sed less than in the other European countries. 
The individual-level variables explain the uncertainties and risks that people 
may face when confronted with market reforms (depending on their labour mar-
ket and social status). We find less support for market principles among women, 
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singles, people in their prime age, the less-educated, the unemployed, and people 
with low income. These differences are more pronounced in the post-communist 
countries. Further, the age cohort effect is significant in post-communist countries 
as young generations are more supportive of market principles than people who 
lived longer periods of their lives under communist rule.
Support for market principles further depends on the economic, societal, 
political, and institutional features of their country-specific contexts. Thus, one 
must be cautious in interpreting these results, as the interplay of the country-
level variables seems to be complex. First, as the government protection hypothesis 
predicts, support for market reforms is greater when people feel more protected 
against the negative consequences of market reforms. Second, there is a positive 
correlation between trust in institutions and support for market principles. Third, 
according to the foregone assets hypothesis, the fear of losing assets due to market 
reforms is higher when a country has a higher level of economic affluence and 
when social protection is better. Under these circumstances, people are less sup-
portive of market reforms, particularly in times when they foresee an imminent 
economic recession. 
Our findings indicate that in post-communist countries (1) the communist 
legacy matters (support for market principles is accompanied by greater support 
for state responsibility to provide for people), but this legacy is losing strength; 
(2) the experience of corruption and poorly-regulated privatisation during the 
transformation period makes people reluctant to adopt market principles; (3) the 
effects of the country-level variables are mostly consistent with the government 
protection hypothesis,9 except for the policy dissatisfaction effect associated with per-
ceptions of high corruption. This means that if people believe they are protected 
by the social security system or they feel more affluent, then support for market 
principles is greater. In other European countries, support for market principles 
is lower when corruption levels are higher, except support for private owner-
ship, which increases with the corruption index; people are probably afraid that 
public officials may abuse public ownership. Support for market principles is 
also lower when there is less trust in the social security system. In other words, if 
levels of corruption are low and levels of trust in the social security system high, 
then people residing in other European countries are more likely to support most 
of the market reforms because they assume the reforms will be implemented in 
a proper and ethical manner that does not favour certain groups. In addition, 
they trust the social security system to be able to compensate them if their socio-
economic situation deteriorates due to the reforms.
In this respect, we find that both the legacy of communism and the economic 
hardship of the transition play a role in making people more sensitive to economic 
risk, and thus decrease support for market reforms and increase demand for gov-
9 In other words, people want more state responsibility when they feel less affluent and 
poorly protected against economic risks.
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ernment protection. However, as the communist legacy hypothesis predicts, the 
differences between post-communist countries and other European countries are 
diminishing. The fifth wave of the EVS from 2017, when released, will enable us 
to examine if this trend continues and to study the economic hardship and other 
negative societal consequences brought about by the crisis. 
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